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An old legend tells how in ancient Egypt, in the city of Thebes there was a temple to the 
goddess Isis in which was a statue of the deity with her face covered by a veil. One 
night, a young man quietly entered into the temple with the intention of lifting the veil 
from the face of the goddess. When he reached the sacred image, he lifted the veil and 
to his surprise there was a second veil. He continued and there was a third veil and so 
on, in a series that seemed endless. In the morning, the priests who guarded the temple 
entered, and were surprised and horrified to find the young man prostrate and plunged 
in deep madness. Consider this ancient legend as a metaphor, to answer some of the 
interesting issues raised by Professor Gash in his recent comment (Constructivism, 
Truth and Reality) to our paperReality, Systems and Impure Systems (Nescolarde-Selva 
and Usó-Doménech, 2013b). 
About truth: The three terms Beauty, Goodness, Truth (kalon, agathou,aletheia) form 
a separate subgroup within the general family of Platonic transcendental ideas and their 
development can be considered separately. There are two rival truth theories: 
correspondence and coherence.  For correspondence theory, truth is a relational property 
involving a specific relation to some portion of reality. For Russell (1912, 129): “Thus a 
belief is true when there is a corresponding fact, and is false when there is no 
corresponding fact”. Bertrand Russell explained the correspondence theory elegantly 
and to sum up the theory, it simply states that a belief, statement, or proposition is true 
if and only if it corresponds with facts (Russell 1912, 119-130). For instance, the 
statement ‘Russell wrote the Problems of Philosophy’ is true if and only if it is indeed 
the case (a fact) that Russell wrote the Problems of Philosophy. Even though truth-
values apply to propositions and beliefs, it also depends on the objective world. A belief 
is false if a complex relation is not a fact. Russell’s correspondence theory is considered 
to be a realist account because Russell argues that even though truth and falsity apply to 
beliefs and propositions, truth is still dependent on how reality really is. It depends on 
facts that are mind and language independent. For instance, the statement “Russell 
wrote the ”Problems of Philosophy” is true if and only if it is indeed the case (a fact) 
that Russell wrote the ”Problems of Philosophy” and that fact is independent of 
language and mind. 
About cultural problems: Since Wittgenstein (1988) warns that it is possible to build 
logic from previously established axioms. An abstract belief level is formed by a set of 
1 
 
elements called substantive beliefs forming the unquestionable truths of the system 
(axioms) and a set of derived beliefs, formed from substantive beliefs. Substantive 
beliefs constitute the axioms of the system, while many of the derived beliefs will 
constitute their theorems(Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013c).If truth is a 
function of propositions and these, in turn, depend on the substantive beliefs, there will 
be as many "truths" as worldviews (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2013a), 
although many of them contradict empirical evidence1and of course this can produce 
strong confrontations. 
 
About Absolute and fragmented reality: What do we know about reality? Consider 
Physics: until the early twentieth century we assumed atoms were indivisible and the 
ultimate touchstone of matter. But no. It was found that they were formed with a core 
composed of protons and neutrons and with a series of orbiting electrons. Neither did 
the complexity stop just there. Most of these particles were in turn made up of quarks 
with strange properties such as color, flavor, charm, etc. And now, still moving to 
deeper explanations we have the superstring. Is this the end? We do not know.  
 
Consider now the field of mathematical knowledge: For example, DR-
logicism(Deductive Russellian logicism): R-logicism is true and there is a consistent, 
recursively axiomatizable and semantically complete theory of logic with all 
mathematical truths among its theorems. DR-logicism is known to be false. Gödel 
showed that the axiomatic simple-type theory embedded in Whitehead and Russell’s 
Principia Mathematica (with the addition of an axiom of infinity) (1910) must, if it is 
consistent, be semantically incomplete. There are logical truths that are not deductive 
consequences of the axioms and inference rules (Landini, 2011). George Cantor 
initiated strong discussion when he promoted the view that there is more than one type 
of “infinity.”. Until his time most mathematicians and philosophers had accepted 
Aristotle’s view that infinity is a potentiality, a single abstraction, and not an actuality. 
Cantor (1955) radically broke with Aristotelian tradition by suggesting that infinity is an 
actuality, not a potentiality, and that it not only exists, but exists in multiple forms. His 
first distinction was between countable and uncountable infinities. Obviously, the 
number of elements in the set of all points on a line segment is also infinite. But are 
these two infinities of the same type? Not at all, said Cantor, because with the set of all 
integers we can count elements, but with the set of points on a line segment we cannot 
count the elements. So, if these infinities are different, should they be given different 
names? Cantor’s answer was in the affirmative, and he began the process of naming 
different infinities by different Aleph numbers. Cantor's ideas that there were infinite 
more infinite than others, in addition to leading to scandal led to the formalization and 
extension of certain concepts such as cardinality and ordinal. We will not delve into 
these concepts as they are well known. We just point out that cardinal indicates 
1An current example: Saleh Al-Fawzan, member of the Saudi Council of Senior Scholars, recently stated 
in a televised interview that not only the Earth does not rotate around the sun, the opposite is true. Proof 
of Al-Fawzan for this assertion that the sun revolved around the earth is none other than the Qur'an. The 
interview was broad cast on Saudi Channel 1 and translated by the Institute of Media Research Middle 
East (MEMRI). In the interview, the presenter asks Al-Fawzan, "Allah says in one verse of the Qur'an: 
"And the sun goes toward its stopping point. That is the determination of the All-Mighty, the All-
Knowing».  ”So the Sun rotates around the earth?" Saleh Al-Fawzan responds by saying: "There is no 
doubt about it. The Quran says: "The sun runs ..." However, they say that he sun is in place and the earth 
moves. This contradicts the Qur'an." He adds, "To ignore the Qur'an and adopt modern theories is not 
something a Muslim can do. A Muslim should follow the Qur'an." 
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unordered set size that is, ignoring order. The set of natural numbers Cantor named as 
ℵ0.The upper power of c will be c1 or 2ℵ  cardinal corresponding to the set of functions 
of a real variable, which is set of, and the definition is, for example [ ]1,0 , is such that 
c22 =ℵ , i.e., has the same cardinal value as the set of continuous parts. If the functions 
are continuous, then the power of the continuum that form is c or 2ℵ . According to 
Fischbein et al. (1979) the world of ,...,, 210 ℵℵℵ composed of actual infinites represents 
a potential, not an actual form of infinity. This makes us think that the perceived or 
conceived reality, is not only fragmented, but seems to be like an onion with many 
layers or like a Russian Matriuska where we do not know where its end is, if it exists. 
But there are more difficulties: contradictions between actual and potential infinity, 
between completed and potential infinity, between addition and accretion, and between 
abstract and concrete (See Oppy, 2006).  Looks like not only would we have 
fragmentation and hierarchy here but both logic of paraconsistency and of coincidentia 
oppositorum govern in what we consider reality. 
About Indispensability Argument:  The Quine-Putnam mathematical indispensability 
argument (Putman, 1971, 1979; Quine, 1953, 1955, 1963, 1981; Quine and Ullian, 
1970) asserts that mathematical entities are on par with other scientific entities from our 
best scientific theories. This argument is an argument for mathematical realism. 
Mathematical entities exist because they are indispensable in our best scientific theories. 
Without them, our best scientific theories would be false (Castro, 2013).The 
indispensability argument, in its most general form, alleges that our knowledge of 
mathematics is justified by our knowledge of empirical science. Quine’s argument is the 
following: 
(QI) QI.1: We should believe the theory which best accounts for our empirical 
experience. 
QI.2: If we believe a theory, we must believe in its ontic commitments. 
QI.3: The ontic commitments of any theory are the objects over which that first-order 
theory quantifies. 
QI.4: The theory which best accounts for our empirical experience quantifies 
mathematical objects. 
QI.C: We should believe that mathematical objects exist. 
Putman’s argument is following: 
(PI) PI.1: We have intuitions about the truth of mathematical statements, and of 
combinatorial facts. 
PI.2: These intuitions are justified quasi-empirically. 
PI.3: Quasi-empirical justifications yield truth. 
PI.C: So, mathematical statements are true, and justified. 
Putnam’s success argument for mathematics is analogous to, and may be compared 
with, his success argument for scientific realism, which we will discuss briefly and then 
set aside. The scientific success argument relies on the claim that any position other 
than realism makes the success of science miraculous. 
(SS) SS.1: Scientific theory is successful. 
SS.2: There must be a reason for the success of science. 
SS.3: No positions other than realism in science provide a reason. 
SS.C: So, realism in science must be correct. 
Given the relatively uncontroversial SS.1 and SS.2, the argument for realism in science 
rests on SS.3, and the miracles argument. But, strictly false theories such as Newtonian 
mechanics can be extremely useful and successful. If realism were the only 
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interpretation which accounted for the success of science, then the utility of many false 
scientific theories is left unexplained. An instrumentalist interpretation on which 
theories may be useful without being true accounts more adequately for the utility of 
false theories. 
There are probably good responses to this quick criticism, but refuting SS is beside the 
point, here. Our point is essentially that the miracles argument is best understood as an 
argument for scientific realism, and not for mathematical realism. We now set it aside 
and examine Putnam’s analogous but independent success argument for mathematics. 
(MS) MS.1: Mathematics succeeds as the language of science. 
MS.2: There must be a reason for the success of mathematics as the language of 
science. 
MS.3: No positions other than realism in mathematics provide a reason. 
MS.C: So, realism in mathematics must be correct. 
Argument Q-P (Quine&Putman) 
(1Q-P) Our best scientific theory of the world makes indispensable use of scientific 
things. (This is taken as an unvarnished fact.) 
(2Q-P) To draw a testable consequence from our theory requires the use of various far 
flung parts of that theory, including much mathematics, so the confirmation resulting 
from a successful test adheres not to individual statements but to large bodies of theory. 
(This is confirmational holism2.) 
(3Q-P) Our theory is committed to those things that one says ‘there are’. (This is 
Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment3.) 
(;) Our theory, and we who adopt it, are committed to the existence of scientific things. 
Experience gives the status of knowledge of the physical world to the rational 
construction. But, experience alone would not in any way guarantee the rationality of 
the construction itself. Empiricism and perception are, in principle, devoid of any 
mathematical rights. 
2Confirmational holism is a view that is extremely important to the empiricist movement. Confirmational 
holism states that when a hypothesis is proven by empirical means, then all underlying theories that 
correspond to that hypothesis are also proven. This is extremely important in regards to furthering our 
understanding of the world. Philosophy can easily get hung up or hit a stopping block as a result of 
instances such as mathematical theory being based on previous mathematical theory. It would seem that 
an almost endless series of proofs must be confirmed in order to even get to any hypothesis that is based 
on empirical findings. However, confirmational holism allows hypotheses as a whole to be verified by 
finding them in nature (Bueno, 2003). Furthermore, confirmational holism takes naturalism one step 
further. Naturalism in short is a scientific process of observing nature. From this scientific process, a 
person can be more certain of asserting statements about the world. However, naturalism on its own does 
not truly confirm anything. This is where confirmational holism steps up and takes over. If naturalism can 
formulate a statement that is more probable then not, and there are mathematical hypotheses that coincide 
with this statement, then everything is confirmed (Colyvan, 2003).  
 
 
3In the philosophy of language and metaphysics, an ontological commitment is said to be necessary in 
order to make a proposition in which the existence of one thing is presupposed or implied by asserting the 
existence of another. We are “committed” to the existence of the second thing, even though we may not 
have expected it, and may have intended to assert only the existence of the first. The kind of secondary 
entities in question are typically abstract objects such as universals, sets, classes, or fictional objects 
(Audi, 1999). 
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However, for nominalists, there are no such things as mathematical entities, these 
entities are abstract entities, and abstract entities simply do not exist. And this leads us 
to the problem of existence. 
About existence: There is a fairly widespread belief that the problem of existence is not 
an essential issue for logic. However, the logical problem of existence and how to treat 
and resolve it completely differs from the corresponding metaphysical problem. 
From the historical point of view, the decisive attempt to solve this problem for 
symbolic logic is due to Russell, who developed it especially in his theory of 
description. However, by including extra logical considerations into the formal 
treatment of the problem, Russell’s exposition is unnecessarily complicated, losing the 
universality that is expected of a formal science. Consider Russell's phrase "The king 
who now governs France is bald". This proposition was considered a false ostensive 
(O)4, not because the King of France has hair, but because the king who governs now 
France does not exist. For an ostensive proposition to be true, it is necessary that the 
respective subject exists and also corresponds predicate. Logic, though formal, must 
deal with the problem of existence. However, logic should be limited to talking about 
"formal existence" or the "existence on a formal system. "That something, which 
formally exists, is also really there, and this does not depend on formal logic, but on 
epistemology, that is, what is understood by "real" and if there is a real correspondence 
to the system given . At a higher system of functions we distinguish: individuals, classes 
of individuals, relations between individuals, and classes of classes of individuals, etc. 
“There are some ....or There is ...." can be formally defined in these systems from the 
words "no", "or", and "all”, for both the individual and classes. Then we can deduce 
that formal existence is nothing other than belonging to the universe of discourse5,where 
4Ostensive definition (Russell, 1984) is the process by which an individual receives instruction to 
understand a lexeme in a different way than through the use of other lexemes. The ostensibility of a 
sender is in inverse proportion to the quantity of information being provided by a particular language. An 
ostensive definition conveys meaning using examples. In this case a Sender refers to an absolute being or 
referent (Ogden and Richards, 1989), also known as designatum (Carnap, 1942). In this case the 
information about the referent is in the foreground. The language in this situation is called an ostensive 
function (OF), because the proposition is the translation of an ostension, equivalent to a remark. When the 
Subject makes a proposition or set of ostensive propositions Subject is operating on Reality. We must 
remember that for the Subject reality is processed with a system of signs encoded in language. Both signs 
and language are heterologous systems or related ways of representing reality. We call ostensive those 
lexemes that function as verbal pointers to references external to the sender that may be real or unreal. 
These minimal units of significance require an address to a reference that the sender locates outside 
himself. In our theory we will divide propositions into ostentives and estimatives. An ostensive 
proposition (O) is one in which the sender specifies connotations that apply to the reference, i.e., the 
nature of the qualitative and quantitative apprehension of reality that at that moment constitutes a referent. 
 
 
5The universe of discourse (or simply universe), is the set of entities over which certain variables of 
interest in some formal treatment may range. The universe of discourse is usually identified in the 
preliminaries, so that there is no need in further treatment to specify each time the range of the relevant 
variables (Corcoran, 1995, 941). For Boole in every discourse, whether of the mind conversing with its 
own thoughts or of the individual in his intercourse with others, there is an assumed or expressed limit 
within which the subjects of its operation are confined. The most unfettered discourse is that in which the 
words we use are understood in the widest possible application, and for them the limits of discourse are 
co-extensive with those of the universe itself. But more usually we confine ourselves to a less spacious 
field.  
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the so-called universe of discourse is the collection of individuals, i.e., values that meet 
or do not meet any function (of the first order)  of the system. The universe of discourse 
is not absolute and given in advance. On the contrary, if we apply symbolic logic to any 
field of science, a belief system or daily life problems, we define a universe of 
discourse. This definition is arbitrary, provided that the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
1) The universe of discourse has at least one element6. 
2) That there are not in the universe of discourse elements in different orders, such as 
individuals or sets7. 
Once these two conditions are met, there is absolute freedom. We might consider, for 
example, implemented a system where the universe of discourse is defined as soccer 
teams. The practical value of this system would be very small, because it could not deal 
with a problem that does not relate directly to soccer clubs. In this case, only soccer 
clubs exist. However, there is nothing exceptional in working with a very limited 
universe of discourse. This is often done in mathematics, where the universe of 
discourse is restricted, for example to natural numbers or points in the plane. Then there 
are just the natural numbers or points in the plane. Then, and as said above, "formally 
exists" (denoted as F∃ ) acquires a relative. What exists for a system or a system 
application, is not necessarily the case for another. Usually the universe of discourse of 
technology is formed so that it is not perpetually changing. However, there could be a 
fantastic technological universe of discourse that includes perpetual motion; for this 
other system, there is perpetual change. For the same reason, in an investigation into the 
mythological animals, both the unicorn and Pegasus exist, contrary to common usage in 
biological research. The relativization of existence is surprising only if we attribute an 
absolute character to the word "exist" in common language. Now there are sentences 
that use "exist" in the sense: "This person does not exist for me," where there is formed 
a universe of discourse that excludes this particular individual. Usually, however, the 
term "exist" is used with an absolute and general sense. But at the moment we want to 
point out that, problems arise distinguishing between "really exist", and "exist in the 
consciousness of man," etc. Each of these terms is itself a source of new discussions8, 
often characterized by obscurity and confusion. Traditional logic does not speak of the 
universe of discourse 9. But it is possible find indications in in the following examples, 
6Starting from an axiomatization, we can work with universes of discourse without a single element. 
 
7This condition is due to type theory. A type theory is any of a class of formal systems, some of which 
can serve as alternatives to set theory as a foundation for all mathematics. In type theory, every "term" 
has a "type" and operations are restricted to terms of a certain type. In a system of type theory, 
each term has a type and operations are restricted to terms of a certain type. A typing judgment  M: A 
describes that the term M has type A. For example, nat may be a type representing the natural numbers 
and 0, 1, 2,… may be inhabitants of that type. The judgment that 2 has type nat is written as 2:nat. A 
function in type theory is denoted with an arrow  . The function   addOne(commonly 
called successor), has the judgment addOne: nat  nat. Calling or "applying" a function to an argument 
is usually written without parentheses, so addOne 2 instead of addOne(2). 
 
8For example:  Is there really an electromagnetic field and potential energy? 
9In seeking formal determinations for "exist", we expect to find them, for example, in formulations like 
"have their own essence." 
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which allow giving a negative answer to the question. The universe of discourse of 
these examples includes what really exists (a physicalistic sense10) and also, spirit, 
justice, love, resignation, etc; but not Pegasus, centaurs, fairies or dragons. The two 
crucial questions are:  
1) Who decides this and what are the criteria? 
2) Will what really will exist with some probability be included in the universe of 
discourse ? 
In the affirmative case, the Siamese twin brothers who could be born on 1 January 2100 
would be included. If not, the next solar eclipse will be excluded. What and where is the 
limit? From a formal point of view, no universe of discourse is given in advance; 
anyone universe of discourse that satisfies the necessary conditions can be used. The 
extended epistemological belief that there is a universe of discourse defined rigorously, 
that would be true and should be "the universe of discourse of logic", cannot be 
justified, as we have seen. 
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